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Abstract: 
This paper argues that decolonial theory can offer a distinctive and valuable ethical 
lens. Decolonial perspectives give rise to an ethics that stresses our fundamentally 
global responsibilities but is distinct from, and critical of, moral cosmopolitanism. 
Decolonial ethics shares with cosmopolitanism a refusal to circumscribe normative 
commitments on the basis of existing political and cultural boundaries. It differs from 
cosmopolitanism, though, by virtue of its rejection of the individualism and 
universalism of cosmopolitan thought. Where cosmopolitan approaches tend to 
articulate abstract principles developed from within a particular Western tradition, 
decolonial approaches reject abstract global designs in favour of inter-cultural 
dialogue amongst multiple people(s), including peoples who deem collective and non-
human entities to be of fundamental moral importance. In addition, decolonial global 
ethics rejects universality in favour of “pluriversality”.  
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Toward a Decolonial Global Ethics 
 
This paper argues that decolonial theory can offer a distinctive and valuable ethical 
lens. Decolonial perspectives give rise to an ethics that is distinct from, and critical of, 
moral cosmopolitanism. Decolonial ethics shares with cosmopolitanism a refusal to 
circumscribe normative commitments on the basis of existing political and cultural 
boundaries. It differs from cosmopolitanism, though, by virtue of its rejection of 
‘individualism’ and ‘universality’ – two ‘elements’ that ‘are shared by all 
cosmopolitan positions’ (Pogge, 1992, 48). Where cosmopolitan approaches tend to 
articulate abstract principles developed from within a particular Western tradition, 
decolonial approaches reject abstract global designs in favour of inter-cultural 
dialogue amongst multiple people(s), including peoples who deem collective and non-
human entities to be of fundamental moral importance. In addition, decolonial global 
ethics rejects universality in favour of “pluriversality”.  
 
This paper serves two purposes. First, it introduces decolonial theory as a theoretical 
framework in global ethics. Second, it offers a distinctive reading of decolonial global 
ethics by reflecting on hitherto ignored tensions between two aspects of pluriversality 
and, relatedly, between two understandings of decoloniality. A value is pluriversal in 
a first, procedural sense, if it is constructed not through the universalisation of a 
particular perspective, but through dialogue across plural cultures and cosmovisions. 
In a second sense, pluriversality connotes a substantive value itself – the value of a 
world in which other worlds are possible. This value binds together equality and 
difference – people(s) have a right to inhabit their different worlds because they are 
equal. The pluriverse, from this substantive perspective, would be a world in which 
multiple cosmovisions, worldviews, practices and livelihoods co-exist, a world where 
no one particular way of living shuts down others. This tension between two different 
forms of pluriversality is related to a second tension between weaker and stronger 
readings of decolonial theory. When thinking in terms of the first form of 
pluriversality – pluriversal values as those that emerge from intercultural dialogue – 
decolonial theory understands itself as offering an option that can take its place at the 
table alongside other options, which might include Westerncentric perspectives, 
liberal cosmopolitanism, and so on. This reading of decoloniality as an option risks 
blunting the critical power of decolonial ethics and leading toward a relativism of 
anything goes. When focusing on pluriversality as both a substantive value and a 
particular process of value formation, by contrast, decoloniality becomes an 
imperative, and explicitly rules out some other visions – including liberal 
cosmopolitan visions – of global ethics. When understood in this stronger form, I 
argue, decolonial global ethics provides an ethical lens fit to challenge the enduring 
legacies of colonialism.  
 
There are two important caveats to the argument developed here. First, I do not 
present an exhaustive and definitive statement of decolonial ethics. Such a statement 
would be impossible, for decolonial ethics has emerged from, and must remain open 
to being shaped by, dialogues amongst millions of grassroots actors and activists. 
Moreover, I do not have space here to explore some important issues, such as the role 
global institutions might play in decolonial ethics (see, i.e., Grosfoguel, 2011, 30). 
Second, cosmopolitanism is an extremely broad church. This paper does not reject all 
cosmopolitan thought. It provides a critique of and alternative to those 
cosmopolitanisms that sit comfortably under Pogge’s definition of moral 
cosmopolitanism as universalistic and individualistic. Though Pogge suggests that 
these features are shared by all cosmopolitan positions, ‘vernacular’ (Werbner, 2006), 
‘emancipatory’ (Pieterse, 2006) and other cosmopolitanisms do not fit his definition. 
Indeed, Mignolo’s ‘cosmopolitan localism’ (2011) is explicitly decolonial in 
orientation.i To this end, my message is not that we ought give up on the idea of 
cosmopolitanism entirely. It is, rather, that decolonial global ethics – regardless of 
whether one describes it as an alternative cosmopolitanism or an alternative to 
cosmopolitanism – provides a plausible alternative to the universalistic and 
individualistic cosmopolitan thought that is currently prevalent in global ethics. This 
alternative is an important one. When rival – nationalist, communitarian, and society 
of states – approaches suggest that we have stronger commitments to those that are 
“close” to us, it is tempting to think that moral cosmopolitanism is the only 
framework that regards ethics as fundamentally global. For this reason Widdows 
(2011, 97) suggests that ‘it makes a lot of sense for a global ethicist to endorse a 
cosmopolitan position of one form or another’. By showing that one can be a 
distinctly global ethicist without adopting the individualism and universalism of 
moral cosmopolitanism, decolonial ethics opens options, beyond the cosmopolitan 
canon, for a fundamentally global ethics.  
 
The following section introduces decolonial thought and its claim that Western 
modernity, and the cosmopolitan values entwined with modernity, have an 
inextricable darker side – coloniality. It also suggests a “colonial matrix of power” 
persists today, and continues to underwrite the purportedly good things – including 
liberal-democratic institutions – that cosmopolitan theorists seek to globalise. If this is 
the case, universalistic and individualistic forms of cosmopolitan thought occlude and 
ultimately reproduce the colonial matrix of power. The third section outlines border 
thinking and pluriversality as distinctive features of decolonial global ethics. Finally, 
the fourth section analyses the tension between different forms of pluriversality and 
stronger and weaker readings of decoloniality, arguing for a stronger reading of 
decoloniality as an imperative, rather than an option.  
 
Coloniality as the Darker Side of Western Modernity 
 
The decolonial school (Alcoff, 2012; Castro-Gómez, 2007; Dussel, 2012; Escobar, 
2004; Grosfoguel, 2011; Lugones, 2007; Maldonaldo-Torres, 2008; Mignolo, 2011; 
Quijano, 2007; Walsh, 2010) suggest that intersecting political, economic, cultural, 
racial, gender, epistemic and other hierarchies have shaped the world since the 
“discovery” of Latin America. These hierarchies – which together form a colonial 
matrix of power, and which persist beyond the end of formal colonial rule – are the 
inextricable darker side of modernity. Key to this matrix are particular values – 
Christianity, civilisation, development, or liberal-Democracy – that have been 
imposed on others as universal and globally applicable designs. Different 
cosmovisions – ways of understanding the world – and different modes of living have 
been crushed, often violently, in the name of such particular perspectives 
masquerading as universal global designs. The decolonial school also reflects on what 
it means to decolonise, focusing on how inter-cultural dialogue amongst people and 
collective peoples on the subordinate side of colonial relations of power can unpick 
multiple, intersecting hierarchies and construct, in their place, a pluriversal world. 
Rather than offering a singular, universal vision of what counts as ethically valuable, 
pluriversality connotes a world in which different worlds can fit – a world in which 
multiple cosmovisions and livelihoods, including those threatened by the colonial 
matrix of power, can survive and thrive.  
 
The distinctiveness of decolonial global ethics stems from an analysis of coloniality 
as the darker side of modernity. Whilst full justification would require the more 
extensive treatment that it has received elsewhere, the claim that coloniality is the 
darker side of modernity provides vital background for understanding decolonial 
ethics. Indeed, decolonial ethics emerged in response to five centuries of, and 
enduring legacies of, colonial rule, and explicitly rejects the idea that normative 
thinking can operate in a historical and political vacuum. This section thus offers a 
decolonial reading of coloniality, contrasting it with Westerncentric understandings of 
modernity implicit in Pagden, Held and Archibugi’s emblematic version of 
cosmopolitan thought. According to Pagden, 
 
it is hard to see how any form of cosmopolitanism can be made to 
address the difficulties of the modern world if it does not…begin 
where Kant…began, that is with some vision of a community of “the 
wise” whose views in the end triumph…In the modern world, it is 
equally hard to see, at least in the immediate future, that those views 
can be anything other than the reflection of the values of Western 
liberal democracies (Pagden, 2000, 19). 
 
For Pagden, cosmopolitan values come from wise elites and travel, in one direction, 
from Western liberal-democracies to the rest. The presumption, here, is that Western 
enlightenment thought provides universal and globally salient values. Similarly, the 
liberal-democratic institutions of Western modernity provide a model for a 
cosmopolitan order. What is regarded as a particularly European history is 
simultaneously regarded as a universal and globally applicable model fit to address 
the ‘difficulties of the modern world’.  
 
Decolonial thought exposes the Westerncentrism of this account. Westerncentrism, 
here, not only refers to the global extension of an idea that has roots in a particular 
culture. Indeed, decolonial thought rejects the idea that there are distinct silos, be they 
communities or nations, with radically separate histories and cultures. Rather, 
Westerncentrism takes at least three often-related forms: historical internalism; 
universalism; and one-way diffusionism (see, i.e., Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). 
All three can be seen in the cosmopolitan democracy project articulated by Archibugi, 
Held and Marchetti.  
 
First, historical internalism relates to understandings of modernity as an intra-
European (and North American) phenomenon. Take Archibugi and Marchetti’s (2009, 
55) claim that ‘until recently the effects of human actions were mostly contained 
within a defined territory’. The ‘recent’, here, refers to the 20th Century processes of 
globalisation that have weakened the state and generated a need and opportunity for a 
cosmopolitan reconfiguration of democracy. This suggestion ignores that ‘defined’ 
territories, and the benefits of living in them, were constituted through the violent 
plunder of colonialism. Second, universalism arises as purportedly Western ideas and 
institutions are regarded as always-already globally salient. One example is the 
individualist and universalist conception of moral personhood that underpins Held’s 
cosmopolitan democracy. Despite being ‘intertwined with liberalism and the 
enlightenment’ and ‘tied to particular traditions and places’, this conception is 
regarded to amount, even prior to dialogue, to a ‘general’, universal ‘claim’ (Held, 
2002, 25). Third, one-way diffusionism refers to the assumption of a uni-directional 
travel of ideas, practices, institutions and forms of historical and economic 
development from West to rest. One might think here of the project of ‘globalising 
democracy’ – rolling out a Western model of liberal democracy – through the 
international enforcement of development and state-building policies (Archibugi and 
Marchetti, 2009, 58).  
 
Archibugi and Marchetti’s historical internalism reflects broader understandings of 
the enlightenment and modernity as a uniquely European/Western experience. 
Voluminous work has asked Weber’s (2001, xxviii) question of why ‘in Western 
civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared 
which…lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.’ The 
assumption, here, is that the enlightenment values that inform cosmopolitan thought, 
and the “modern” institutions protecting these values, arose endogenously in Europe. 
What happens, though, if we shift geopolitical perspective away from Europe and 
towards the ‘immense majority of humanity, the seventy-five percent of the world 
situated in the southern hemisphere, the excolonial world’ (Dussel, 1995, 7)? This 
epistemic shift enables decolonial thought to counter Westerncentrism by highlighting 
both the globality of Western history and the provincialism of Western 
understandings (Chakrabarty, 2000). Key to this critique is the claim that, contra 
historical internalism, Western modernity was and continues to be produced through 
global coloniality. As a result, ‘there is no modernity without coloniality, with the 
latter being constitutive of the former’ (Escobar, 2004, 11). Modernity was 
intertwined with both formal colonialism and coloniality, understood as the set of 
hierarchies that emerged with, and have continued beyond, colonial rule. The claim 
here is that coloniality, rather than being an accidental and ultimately separable 
byproduct of modernity, is constitutive of modernity. One cannot, therefore, simply 
take things one likes from modernity whilst leaving behind its coloniality. The one-
way diffusion of Western modernity advocated in cosmopolitan thought is thus 
neither possible nor desirable. 
 
In what way is coloniality constitutive of modernity? Coloniality was constitutive of 
the emergence first, of a capitalist modernity, second, of modern liberal-democratic 
institutions, and third, of enlightenment knowledge formations. Key, here, was the 
accidental “discovery” of Latin America. This “discovery” and subsequent conquest 
and colonisation mark, for the decolonial school, the ‘birthdate of modernity’ (Dussel, 
1995, 11).  
 
With the conquest of the societies and cultures which inhabit what 
today is called Latin America, began the constitution of a new world 
order, culminating, five hundred years later, in a global power covering 
the whole planet (Quijano, 2007, 168).  
 
By 1650, the continent’s population had gone from around 90 million to 10 million 
(Dussel, 1995). Why, though, was this extraordinary death and destruction 
constitutive of modernity? I focus here on how coloniality is constitutive of capitalist 
modernity and a political modernity combining (liberal) individual rights and 
democratic government, before highlighting how enlightenment knowledge 
formations are bound up with epistemic forms of coloniality.  
 
Decolonial theory joins World Systems Theory in suggesting that colonialism was 
constitutive of capitalist modernity.  
 
Europe did not pull itself up by its own economic bootstraps, and 
certainly not thanks to any kind of European “exceptionalism” of 
rationality, institutions, entrepreneurship, technology…instead Europe 
used its American money to muscle in and benefit from Asian 
production, markets, trade (Frank, 1998, 5). 
 
Puerto Rico – the rich port, Argentina (from argentum – silver), and the Gold Coast in 
Panama were just some of the places from which precious metals were extracted 
(Dussel, 1995). The resources extracted – at great cost to workers enslaved in mines 
and people(s) dispossessed from land – were used to buy goods in Eastern markets. 
The discovery of gold, the ‘extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the 
aboriginal population’, together with ‘the turning of Africa into a warren for the 
commercial hunting of black skins’ all ‘signalised the rosy dawn of the era of 
capitalist production’ (Marx, 1906, 823). Without this plunder, the accumulation of 
resources so central to the birth and reproduction of capitalism would not have been 
possible. Colonialism was constitutive of capitalist modernity. 
 
Second, coloniality was constitutive of liberal-democratic political institutions. 
Democratic government and liberal rights, in particular rights to private property, can 
be contradictory. For Locke, man (and he meant man) had an inalienable right to 
property. He also thought that man, being free and equal, ought to have a say in and 
consent to government. Locke was, however, writing in a context in which only a 
minority had private property. Were those without property given an equal say in 
government, one would presume that they would radically redistribute property, and 
hence violate those inalienable rights to property. Locke therefore  
 
had to show how society could be based on the principles of private 
property and government by consent in the absence of a majority of 
individuals supporting such developments, or, conversely, how the 
majority of the population could be convinced to establish and 
maintain such a polity (Jahn, 2013, 44). 
 
In addressing this paradox, Locke gave the international politics of colonialism ‘a 
crucial role in the constitution of domestic liberalism’ (Jahn, 2013, 48). As Locke put 
it,  
 
there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants 
thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of 
the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the 
people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in 
common (Locke, 1988, 2:45). 
 
Land in the Americas remained common because, in roaming across land, indigenous 
peoples had not mixed labour with land and hence, according to Locke’s parochially 
produced but purportedly universal and globally salient account, had not acquired the 
land as inalienable property. This  “empty” land was given to people leaving in search 
of a better life in the colonies and used to extract resources that would drive economic 
growth. In settler colonies, the appropriation of land from indigenous peoples, 
combined with the widespread destruction of those peoples and their cosmovisions 
concerning the collective stewardship of territory, ensured a wide distribution of, and 
common interest in the protection of, individual private property. It was only through 
this plunder and racialised redistribution that democratic principles could be 
combined with liberal rights. ‘There was no need to fear revolution and hence 
universal franchise was generally introduced earlier in settler societies’ (Jahn, 2013, 
65). In Europe, over time, the economic growth enabled by colonialism led to a wider 
distribution of property, an enlarged middle class, and a mutual ‘interest in 
expropriating foreign land’, enabling the vote to be extended gradually over time 
(Jahn, 2013, 64). In both cases, coloniality was vital in enabling democratic 
government to coexist with liberal property rights. Coloniality was thus constitutive of 
the possibility of liberal-democratic institutions.  
 
Third, coloniality is bound up with enlightenment knowledge formations. Decolonial 
thought focuses on epistemic forms of coloniality. Epistemic coloniality refers, in 
part, to hierarchies according to which Western knowledge and Western history is 
universally salient, whilst knowledges and histories from the other side of the colonial 
divide are provincial. To study the West would be to study general laws of 
development or universal principles of modernisation, but to study the South or East 
would be to study an “area” or a “culture” that produces data applicable only to a 
limited portion of the world. The coloniality of knowledge refers also to the form of 
knowledge construction in enlightenment thought. Rather than acknowledging that 
thought happens from a geo-political location and involves an embodied subject with 
a history, culture, social structure and feelings that may inflect their thought, 
enlightenment thought works to ‘dissociate the subject from all bodies and territories; 
that is, to empty the subject of all spatial or temporal dimensions’. In thinking from a 
non-place, the disembodied thinker is able to ‘speak beyond all the spatio-temporal 
limits of the cartography of social power’ (Grosfoguel, 2012, 88; see also Castro-
Gómez, 2007 and Maldonaldo-Torres, 2008). It then becomes possible to imagine that 
ideas, values, practices and institutions that have a particular history can be, and ought 
to be, imposed as global, universal designs (Mignolo, 2000).  
 
The content of un-located, disembodied and hence universal knowledges can and has 
varied. What they have in common is that their universalisation shuts down 
alternative ways of knowing. The universalisation of Locke’s particular understanding 
of property shut down alternative understandings of how to relate to land/territory. 
Similarly, the universalisation of a Baconian view of nature as something to be 
mastered and exploited for human use through techno-scientific forms of knowledge – 
a view that remains prevalent in many visions of perpetual development and endless 
economic growth – shuts down Aymara, Quechua and other notions of Sumak 
Kawsay or Buen Vivir – living well.ii Aymara and Quechua cosmovisions are said not 
to contain the idea of a separation between humans and nature – a separation that 
makes it possible to think, with Bacon, that nature is there to be exploited for human 
use. Moreover, Sumak Kawsay contrasts with visions of perpetual development and 
growth insofar as it refers to living well – not better than others and not necessarily 
better than before (see Gudynas, 2011 and Walsh, 2010). Rather than being 
appreciated as different forms of knowledge based on different cosmovisions, these 
knowledges are locked in a hierarchical relationship. The Baconian, techno-scientific 
view of nature is thought from a particular position, yet has been elevated, without 
dialogue and exchange across cosmovisions, to the status of an already-universal 
global design, fit for imposition on societies elsewhere. ‘At best’, Quechua, Aymara 
and indigenous American perspectives, as perspectives from the other side of the 
colonial divide, provide ‘practical and local forms of knowledge’, subordinate to the 
West’s purportedly universal and globally applicable knowledge’ (Santos, Nunes and 
Meneses, 2007, xxxv). At worst, they represent uncivilised, backward worldviews; 
obstacles to progress that must be destroyed.  
 
Decolonial thought links epistemic hierarchies with economic, military, political and 
other hierarchies in a “colonial matrix of power”. The conflation of ‘the concrete 
hegemony derived from’ Western power and a form of thought that portends ‘abstract 
universality’ (Dussel, 2000, 471) gives Western ‘local knowledges and histories’ the 
status of ‘global designs’, valid, applicable, and ultimately enforced everywhere 
(Mignolo, 2000, 17). The global designs that have been enforced over time have 
varied, but what they have in common is that they universalised a particular notion of 
what is good, valuable, or appropriate. As Grosfoguel puts it: 
 
The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the so-called savages 
and barbarians in the 16th century, followed by the imposition of 
“white man’s burden” and “civilizing mission” in the 18th and 19th 
century, the imposition of the “developmentalist project” in the 20th 
century and, more recently, the imperial project of military 
interventions under the rhetoric of “democracy” and “human rights” in 
the 21st century, have all been imposed by militarism and violence 
under the rhetoric of modernity, of saving the other from its own 
barbarianism (Grosfoguel, 2011, 25) 
 
This universalisation of local knowledge not only generates great violence, but also 
threatens, as indicated above, the knowledges and cosmovisions of others. In this 
sense, colonial encounters not only amount to the killing of huge numbers of people. 
They also constitute a form of epistemicide. Enlightenment forms of knowledge, 
based on the presumed universality of disembodied, placeless thought, are integral to 
this epistemicide.  
 
To sum up, for the decolonial school, (global) coloniality is constitutive of (Western) 
modernity. Capitalism and liberal-democratic institutions were only possible through 
the colonial encounter, whilst enlightenment knowledge production, with its emphasis 
on disembodied universality, was bound up with the colonial imposition of particular 
perspectives set up as global designs. Modernity, then, is inseparable from a colonial 
matrix of power – an ‘intersectionality of multiple, heterogeneous global hierarchies 
(heterachies) of sexual, political, gender, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and 
racial forms of domination and exploitation’ (Grosfoguel, 2011, 11). This matrix 
classifies people, and treats them differently according to ‘culture, religion, colour 
and continent’ (Mignolo, 2011, 221).  
 
This colonial matrix of power persists after formal colonial rule. Poverty and 
inequality operate along racialised, gendered and geopolitical lines, legacies of 
colonial rule are felt in contemporary forms of conflict and in so-called state “failure”, 
and the export of liberal-democratic institutions of modernity continue to be outlined 
as a remedy (see Wai, 2012). Cultural hierarchies – which also operate along 
racialised, gendered and geopolitical lines – also remain, with indigenous art likely to 
be shown in a gallery showcasing “culture”, rather than high art. Epistemic 
hierarchies, too, remain. One might think, here, of accounts of how global human 
rights norms are made to fit with “local cultures” by actors in the global South, 
without attention being paid to how these “local” actors also transform meanings and 
understandings of global rights (see Dunford, 2017). The colonial matrix of power 
also continues to constitute the liberal democracies of the West. Cheap food and 
cheap consumer goods are available in the West as a result of the extraction of natural 
resources, the destruction of peasant, indigenous and other livelihoods, and a 
racialised and gendered division of global labour. With a decreasing proportion of 
income going to labour, and with “ordinary” workers feeling the pinch of rising 
inequality, stagnant wages, deepening austerity, and a reduction of public services, 
these cheap goods, together with the vilification of racialised migrants, continue to 
underwrite liberal-democratic compromises.  
 
Acknowledging coloniality as the still-present darker side of modernity raises 
questions for calls for the globalisation of the values and institutional practices that 
constitute Western modernity. If the emergence and reproduction of modern Western 
values and institutions depend on exploitation elsewhere then – contra Archibugi, 
Held and Pagden – they should not serve as a global model, and a different, 
decolonial global ethics is required.  
 
Decolonial Global Ethics 
 
This section explores how decolonial reflections on, and responses to, coloniality as 
the darker side of modernity give rise to a distinctive global ethics. Given that 
coloniality involves particular perspectives being imposed as global designs, there 
may be a temptation to think that decolonial ethics would reject any global agenda on 
the basis that it will inevitably crush differences and reinforce coloniality. Calls for a 
world in which diverse, purportedly separate “cultures” are isolated and left alone do 
not, however, challenge the colonial matrix of power. Not only do they ignore the 
interconnectedness of different parts of the world, and hence sidestep the question of 
duties of redress for past and ongoing injustices. They also reinforce epistemic 
hierarchies rendering those on the underside of the colonial difference able to develop 
ideas of only “local” significance. Challenging the colonial matrix of power is a 
global project, meaning that decolonial ethics is and must be globally minded. It 
differs from cosmopolitan global ethics, however, in several important respects, of 
which I shall focus on two: border thinking and pluriversality.  
 
Border Thinking  
 
Reflecting the enlightenment knowledge formations criticised by decolonial theory, 
cosmopolitan thought tends to think in abstract universalist terms, without reflecting 
on the geopolitical location of the person who is speaking. Moreover, with notable 
exceptions including Sen’s (2009, xii) self-proclaimed ‘unusual’ and ‘eccentric’ 
approach, cosmopolitan global ethics tends to think with a tradition of thought 
running through ‘Aristotle, Stoics, Renaissance humanism, Kant, Rawls, Habermas’ 
(Pieterse, 2006, 1251). Whilst the poor and the marginalised are often the object of 
cosmopolitan theorising, they are very rarely taken seriously as potential producers of 
theory and knowledge, or as potential agents of change.iii As Deveaux (2015, 127; see 
also Dussel, 2013) puts it, cosmopolitan work on global justice is ‘marked by an 
absence of attention to the perspectives, aspirations, and political strategies of poor 
communities’. Decolonial thought, by contrast, begins from what it calls the 
“borders” or “margins”. This sub-section shall explore what this means and explain 
why it results in a rejection of the individualism of moral cosmopolitanism.  
 
Though coloniality has led to the destruction of cosmovisions and livelihoods, there 
remain  
 
present-day cultures that predate European modernity, that have 
developed together with it, and that have survived until the present 
with enough human potential to give birth to a cultural plurality that 
will emerge after modernity (Dussel, 2002, 234). 
 
To think from the borders is to think with these ‘subaltern knowledges and cultural 
practices worldwide that modernity itself shunned, suppressed, made invisible and 
disqualified’ (Escobar, 2004, 3). So doing means taking seriously as producers of 
knowledge those marginalised individuals, communities and traditions. ‘Voices of the 
south must be heard’, Maldonaldo-Torres (2008, 250) argues, not just ‘because we 
presume or have ‘faith’ in the equal value of other cultures…but because the centuries 
old experience of coloniality and dehumanization provides colonized subjects with 
important perspectives’. One’s geopolitical position and experience plays a role in 
shaping thought, and taking those on the receiving end of colonial forms of 
domination as producers of knowledge will mean understanding better, and being able 
to respond better to, legacies of colonial rule. Decolonial thought thus gives ‘a 
preferential option for the condemned of the earth’ by placing at its centre ‘the 
questions, concerns and proposals for decolonization that emerge in the underside of 
the modern world’ (Maldonaldo-Torres, 2008, 246).  
 
Thinking from the borders not only involves giving this ‘preferential option’ to those 
on the receiving end of colonial rule. As Mignolo (2011, xiii) points out, ‘the borders 
relate ‘not to where you reside but where you dwell’ (Mignolo, 2011, xiii). In other 
words, it relates not to where you happen to be, or where you are from, but to the 
perspective from which you think. Much as it is possible for someone residing in a 
marginalised community to adopt the worldview of the coloniser, it is possible for 
someone in a distant location to attempt to think from the geo-epistemic perspective 
of those threatened by global coloniality. To do so, however, would require engaging 
with, listening to, and responding to the actually-existing voices of people attempting 
to challenge colonial legacies. It is insufficient – as is common in cosmopolitan global 
ethics (e.g. Caney, 2015, 51) – to merely ‘imagine’ that you are in their position, only 
to draw exclusively on the Western canon, and not engage with marginalised actors as 
producers of moral theory.  
 
Starting from the borders leads to a further notable difference between decolonial and 
cosmopolitan global ethics. The moral cosmopolitanism to which decolonial thought 
offers an alternative identifies individual persons as the only unit worthy of 
fundamental moral concern. Other being(s) – mother nature, communities, and so on, 
can be only of derivative concern on the basis that they are valued by, and/or support 
and realise the rights of, the individuals that ultimately matter. Some of the 
cosmovisions that operate at the borders have different understandings of what is of 
fundamental moral significance. There are, for instance, indigenous cultures in Sub-
Saharan Africa that embrace the notion of ubuntu, that a person is a person only 
through other people, and hence deem the community to be of fundamental concern 
(Metz, 2014). Aymara and Quechua cosmovisions discussed earlier emphasise Sumak 
Kawsay, living well in harmony with Pachamama – Mother Nature – and the 
community. Given that these different perceptions of fundamental moral importance 
exist, decolonial ethics refuses to specify in advance what counts as worthy of such 
importance. To settle this question in advance serves only to exclude some positions 
in the name of a particular, individualistic value that is projected as a universal and 
global design. As such, it would reproduce epistemic forms of coloniality in which 
only some are able to speak for what is universally and globally significant.iv  
 
Despite this rejection of individualism, decolonial ethics does not revert to a 
communitarian position according to which different cultures have their own isolated 
value systems and normative standards. The borderlands are already inflected with 
global processes. They are, after all, borderlands – places where a global form of 
coloniality is felt as domination, dispossession and potential epistemicide. The 
borders, then, provide an epistemic location from which to develop a critique ‘of 
modernity from the geo-political experiences and memories of coloniality’ 
(Grosfoguel, 2011, 24). To think from the borders is, moreover, to think with clashing 
perspectives. It is to bring into productive dissonance and develop a critical 
perspective on both modernity and the livelihoods and cosmovisons that it threatens. 
In this sense it is not anti-modern but transmodern – it involves thinking beyond 
modernity from the perspective of its borders (Dussel, 2012). One might think, for 
instance, of the way in which Zapatistas combine indigenous comsovisions and 
Marxist perspectives in a manner that ‘remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and 
indigenism, without being either of them’ (Escobar, 2007, 188). Moreover, decolonial 
thought does not end with thinking from the borders. Rather, border thinking forms 
part of a broader, transnational project of inter-cultural dialogue. Coloniality is global 
in scope, as are the dynamics that destroy livelihoods – the resource extraction and 
appropriation that threatens indigenous livelihoods, the labour regulations harming 
workers, and the land grabs that undermine peasant livelihoods. Moreover, epistemic 
coloniality involves framing certain knowledges and understandings as parochial and 
merely “local”, whilst framing others as rational, universal and global. Overcoming 
epistemic hierarchies means taking seriously as producers of globally salient 
knowledge those shunned by modernity. Key, then, is constructing a set of global 
understandings in a different way – a way that does not involve the one-way diffusion 
of locally produced and yet purportedly universal global designs. It is here that we 
meet the idea of pluriversality. 
 
Pluriversality 
 
Pluriversality refers, first, to the way in which a value is constructed and second, to a 
particular value of a world in which many worlds fit. As indicated earlier, universal 
values are constructed from a particular place, and yet deemed global in significance. 
Recall Held’s (2002, 25) individualism, which is ‘intertwined with liberalism and the 
enlightenment’, ‘tied to particular traditions and places’, and yet regarded to amount, 
prior to democratic dialogue, to a ‘general’ and universal claim. Pluriversal values, by 
contrast, are a product of inter-cultural dialogue. A value is pluriversal insofar as it is 
constructed in a manner that takes seriously, shows respect for, and emerges from 
communication and exchange across multiple places, cultures and cosmovisions.v 
This dialogue can involve forms of communication ranging from argument and 
discussion to performance and ceremony. Such communication, together with 
respectful translation across cultures and cosmovisions, can foster commonality, as 
people share stories of common forms of oppression. It can also develop values that 
have global significance not by virtue of an already-existing universality that can be 
articulated from one particular place, but on the basis of resonances amongst, 
translation across and the construction of common understandings amongst multiple 
positions.  
 
Pluriversal dialogue is emphatically not something that an individual can perform 
through a thought experiment or imagined dialogue. To attempt to do so would return 
to a view that one can think inclusively – and think something that is universally valid 
– from one place. This would go against the decolonial commitment to take seriously 
as sources of knowledge those individuals and communities that have been on the 
receiving end of colonial domination. Pluriversal dialogue refers to real dialogue 
across a range of existing cultures and comsovisions. Indeed, the idea of pluriversal 
dialogue has emerged from attempts to foster such dialogue. One might think, here, of 
the dialogues across indigenous and Marxist traditions that helped construct the 
Zapatista movement (Mignolo 2011), dialogues across indigenous, peasant, pastoralist 
and fisherfolk cultures in the food sovereignty movement (Martínez-Torres and 
Rosset, 2014), and feminist dialogic practice in the World Social Forum (Leinius, 
2014; Conway and Singh, 2011). Moreover, pluriversal dialogue is not solely oriented 
towards consensus. Those involved in dialogue may include indigenous groups ‘who 
want disengagement and autonomy more than anything else’ (Alcoff, 2012, 64). In 
order to respect the autonomy of indigenous worlds, which might be governed in 
different ways and by different authorities, pluriversal dialogue can involve ‘letting 
plurality stand, allowing convergence and cooperation to emerge in an unforced way, 
and rejecting the need for consensus-decision making’ (Conway and Singh, 2009, 74). 
In this regard, pluriversal dialogue can be ‘oriented towards defending localised life-
projects and life spaces’ (Conway and Singh, 2011, 698), with a view to constructing 
a world in which the worlds of indigenous peoples, amongst others, fit.  
 
It is here that we meet the second aspect of pluriversality. Pluriversality connotes a 
value of, as articulated by the Zapatistas, “a world in which many worlds fit” or “a 
world in which many worlds are possible”. Global coloniality threatens the survival of 
multiple worlds, be they the worlds of peasant farmers, indigenous peoples or others. 
Worlds other than the world of Christianity, then civilisation, then development, and 
now rapacious and environmentally destructive economic growth are impossible for 
many, especially for those without the privilege of being able to purchase an 
alternative “lifestyle”. A pluriversal world would be a world where indigenous 
peoples, so often threatened with displacement, would cease to be prevented from 
living from their territory, whilst peasants would be supported in working the land to 
produce their own food on their own territory, provided these practices do not shut 
down those other worlds that, in turn, do not shut down alternatives. A particular way 
of living, policy, institutional practice, or value is compatible with a pluriverse if it 
allows other worlds to survive and thrive, and incompatible if it inevitably involves 
the destruction of other life-worlds.  
 
This principle is based on and grounded in an understanding of the inseparability of 
equality and difference. ‘A world in which many worlds are possible…means that 
people and communities have the right to be different precisely because we are all 
equals’ (Mignolo, 2000, 311; Maldonaldo-Torres, 2008, 231). If we don’t take 
difference seriously, and do not take seriously those that consider Pachamama to be 
of fundamental ethical importance, then we do not treat these peoples as equals. If we 
suggest that different livelihoods need to be overcome in the name of a form of 
development that the people affected do not demand, then we are not treating them as 
equals. To treat people as equals, then, is to take seriously difference and ensure a 
world in which many different worlds fit. It is also, as Dussel (2013, xvi) argues, 
‘grounded in the daily life and the dominant models prevalent in that context’ – in the 
very experience of injustice in the face of the destruction of multiple worlds. To this 
end, pluriversality is also a response to experiences, discussed in the first section, of 
dispossession, domination, and epistemicide in the face of the longstanding and 
enduring colonial matrix of power. 
 
Tensions in Decolonial Global Ethics: Toward a Decolonial Imperative?vi 
 
Decolonial ethics is not without its tensions, some of which I explore in this section. 
In principle, the above two aspects of pluriversality cut in different directions. The 
pluriversal as that which is formed through inter-cultural dialogue points in the 
direction of a dialogue in which positions are not excluded in advance (even if this 
dialogue may take place, initially at least, only amongst the oppressed), and in which 
no particular standard or value is valid in advance of dialogue.vii Taken alone, this 
form of pluriversality raises questions. Does intercultural dialogue have any limits or 
constraints? Are values justified solely by virtue of having emerged through inter-
cultural dialogue, or is it possible for a value to be wrong, normatively speaking, 
despite emerging from this process? Are any and all views allowed to the table, or 
ought certain views be rejected? What about those views that reproduce colonial 
narratives or values that have done so much to silence, undermine and oppress those 
on the underside of the colonial matrix of power? Taken alone, this aspect of 
pluriversality cannot provide an account of whether there are views, practices, and 
modes of engagement that should not be allowed in discussion. Nor can it rule out, as 
illegitimate, views, values, practices or policies that, despite emerging from 
discussion, may nonetheless go on to oppress others.  
 
It is here that pluriversality as a value enters. Pluriversality as a value suggests that 
practices, worldviews, values, or policies are legitimate only if they remain 
compatible with the existence of other worlds. In this sense, pluriversality sets a 
standard of legitimacy that would judge as morally wrong any worldview, value or 
practice that does not accept the existence of, or that works to shut down, other 
worlds. That is not necessarily to say, though, that those holding such views ought to 
be excluded from dialogue.  
 
There is a tension, then, between the two aspects of pluriversality. Giving ultimate 
priority to one aspect cannot solve this tension. Without any reflection on its 
emergence from pluriversal dialogue, the substantive value of pluriversality would 
become a new abstract, already-universal design, and would undermine all 
commitment to taking seriously as producers of knowledge those that are 
marginalised. Without the substantive value, there is no way of identifying why a 
dialogue that takes seriously multiple cosmovisions is a morally good thing. Nor 
would there be any way of casting any judgment on or identifying as morally wrong 
certain visions – racist visions, sexist visions, visions that advocate a form of 
modernity that inevitably reproduces coloniality. Both aspects of pluriversality must 
remain, and decolonial global ethics must find ways of navigating (if not resolving) 
any tension between them.  
 
It will be for pluriversal dialogue to find ways of navigating this potentially 
irresolvable tension. To offer some ideas to any such discussion, it is worth noting 
that the substantive value of pluriversality has emerged, in practice, through 
pluriversal exchanges in indigenous, peasant (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2014), 
feminist (Leinius, 2014) and World Social Forum praxis (Conway and Singh, 2011). 
Having emerged as an abstract value through concrete, intercultural dialogue, it can, 
in turn, retrospectively account for why it is that such dialogue is, normatively 
speaking, a good thing.  One might also note that the abstract value of a world in 
which other worlds are possible does not give rise immediately to concrete values, 
practices, policies and attitudes. Understanding what kind of practices, policies, and 
modes of behaving and living enable other worlds to exist, and fostering the kind of 
respect for other worlds that such practices and ways of living may require, requires 
pluriversal dialogue, for it is through such exchanges that it will become apparent that 
certain demands and ways of living can and do result in the oppression of others. Both 
aspects of pluriversality can thus be mutually enriching in practice, despite the 
potential for tension between them. Whilst there is not room to introduce them in 
depth here, any readers inclined to think that this tension makes decolonial ethics 
unworkable, hopelessly idealistic and of no use in the “real world” would be advised 
to explore the practices of the social movements that navigate these tensions.  
 
Related to this difference between the two aspects of pluriversality are tensions 
between decoloniality as an option and decoloniality as an imperative. For Mignolo,  
 
there will be no place for one option to pretend to be the option. The 
decolonial option is not aiming to be the one. It is just an option that, 
beyond asserting itself as such, makes clear that all the rest are also 
options (Mignolo 2011, 21).  
 
Similarly, 
 
what we put on the table is an option to be embraced by all those who 
find in the option(s) a response to his or her concern and who will 
actively engage, politically and epistemically, to advance projects of 
epistemic and subjective decolonisation and in building communal 
futures (Mignolo, 2011, xxvii).  
 
This weaker version of decoloniality appears not to rule out, as incompatible with 
decolonial global ethics, other visions. ‘Western civilization’ would then, Mignolo 
(2011, 176) suggests, ‘merely be one among many options, and not the one guide to 
rule the many.’ The decolonial option serves to add another option to the table. It does 
not necessarily reject Western modernity, liberal cosmopolitanism, or other positions, 
provided that they, too, present themselves only as an option. When understanding 
pluriversality in terms of its procedural aspect, this makes perfect sense. It would be 
wrong to set out, in advance, one option as an imperative, as one we ought to follow, 
albeit in different ways. The worry with this weaker version, however, is that it risks 
‘losing the ability for critique’ (Alcoff, 2012, 6) and becoming a relativism of 
anything goes.  
 
For Grosfoguel (2012, 101), by contrast, pluriversality is not ‘a relativism of anything 
goes’. Similarly, for Dussel (2012, 19), a decolonial perspective does ‘not presuppose 
the illusion of a non-existent symmetry between cultures’. Instead, it acknowledges 
that some cultures, cosmovisions, and livelihoods are systematically threatened by 
others and cannot survive in the face of cosmovisions and lifestyles that are 
inextricably tied to the ceaseless extraction of resources, the dispossession of people 
and poor working conditions. These perspectives follow when the substantive value 
of pluriversality is invoked. If the practices, institutions and lifestyles that we 
associate with modernity continue to depend upon and be constituted by coloniality, 
then these are not compatible with a world in which other worlds fit. It is for this 
reason that Dussel suggests that decolonial liberation is ‘impossible for capitalism’ 
and must not accept the colonial matrix of power ‘as a whole’ (Dussel, 2013, 138). 
Though Mignolo primarily presents decoloniality as an option, at other times he 
suggests that ‘pluriversal futures…are only possible if the reign of economic 
capitalism ends’, on the basis that economic capitalism provides space only for 
practices that can be turned into, or do not obstruct, profits, and hence does not allow 
different worlds to exist on equal terms (Mignolo, 2011, 292).  
 
This article is not the place to analyse the validity of Mignolo and Dussel’s accounts 
of capitalism. The point is to suggest that decoloniality should be considered an 
imperative, and not just an option to be placed on the table. So understood, decolonial 
global ethics goes beyond a relativism of anything goes. Any option that inevitably 
depends upon the systematic destruction of other words would violate the principle of 
a world in which many worlds fit. Decoloniality, and its central value – pluriversality 
– invoke stringent demands that rule out a number of worlds, practices, and lifestyles. 
It identifies as wrong a world of economic capitalism if and insofar as it inevitably 
depends on, and cannot be reformed to prevent, the destruction of other worlds. It 
identifies as wrong practices of resource extraction, if and insofar as they destroy the 
livelihoods of peasant and indigenous peoples. It identifies as wrong highly polluting 
lifestyles, if and insofar as they lead to the destruction of the lives and cosmovisions 
of those who are dispossessed and displaced as a result of environmental change. It 
means, finally, that Western civilization as we know it cannot be one legitimate 
option among many if and insofar as it is constituted through, and cannot be separated 
from, coloniality.  
 
If decolonial global ethics is to unpick the colonial matrix of power and liberate 
people(s) from domination, it must be an imperative. It must be understood, as it is by 
Mignolo (2011, 23) in one of his stronger statements, as a project ‘which all 
contending options would have to accept’. This does not mean that decoloniality and 
pluriversality offer a singular and rigid global design. A pluriversal world is one in 
which multiple options are possible – a world in which many worlds can co-exist. 
Whilst other options would be circumscribed insofar as they would have to accept the 
decolonial imperative of working towards a pluriversal world, this still leaves room 
for many options, many possible lives, livelihoods and cosmovisions. Only those 
worlds that involve, inextricably, the continued domination of others are judged as 
wrong (though it may well be the case that such views should not be excluded from 
dialogue, given that dialogue itself may help enrich the kind of mutual respect that 
would lead to the abandonment of such views). Far from invoking a relativism of 
anything goes, this principle is a demanding one, with radical implications for global 
social structures and ways of living. The building of a pluriverse is and must be an 
open-ended project, fed by dialogues amongst actors from across the world. 
Moreover, the demand of a pluriverse may be impossible to meet fully; in an 
interconnected world, it may be impossible to ensure that it is not the case that the 
actions of some constrain the worlds of others. This does not mean, however, that 
some worlds, practices, livelihoods, lifestyles, and institutional designs are not more 
compatible with a pluriverse than others. Recognising interconnectedness – and the 
long history of interconnectedness – only increases the importance of striving for a 
pluriversal world in an attempt to build a world free from the domination and 
destruction of the colonial matrix of power.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Decolonial theory makes a distinctive and valuable contribution to global ethics. It 
begins with an analysis of coloniality as the inextricable darker side of modernity. In 
reflecting on what it would mean to decolonise, decolonial theory offers a 
fundamentally global ethics that is distinct from individualistic and universalistic 
cosmopolitan theory. It begins with those perspectives threatened by a colonial matrix 
of power, and proposes inter-cultural dialogue across diverse cosmovisions. In so 
doing, it refuses to specify, in advance, what is of fundamental moral significance. 
Finally, it embraces pluriversality. Plurversality refers, on the one hand, to a way of 
constructing values. A value is pluriversal if, rather than being set up as an abstract 
and already-universal value, it is constructed through dialogue across multiple 
cosmovisions. Pluriversality also refers to a value of a world in which many words fit. 
Pluriversality thus offers an account of both a global process through which global 
values can legitimately be formed, and a value that can be used to judge particular 
practices, policies, processes, or social structures.  
 
Pluriversality as a value is demanding and judges as morally wrong practices and 
social structures that inevitably dispossess others. But it is not equivalent to those 
universal, global designs central to the colonial matrix of power. It is not equivalent, 
in part, because it embraces radical difference and seeks to multiply options, rather 
than close them down. It also differs in that it has emerged from, and can only be 
fleshed out through, a process of pluriversal exchange. Decolonial theory has been 
constructed alongside and through social movement practice. The above presentation 
of the value of pluriversality, and of the distinctive features of decolonial theory more 
broadly, has only been possible in light of the work of peasant, indigenous, feminist 
and World Social Forum activists contesting various aspects of the colonial matrix of 
power. Taking decolonial global ethics seriously opens avenues for further work 
judging whether, how, and why given practices, policies, processes and structures are 
compatible with pluriversality in both senses of the term. If this article encourages 
global ethicists to explore further these questions, then it would have played its small 
part in contributing to the construction of an ethical framework that can take seriously 
and challenge the legacy of colonial rule.  
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decolonial thought’s disruption of prevalent figurations, languages and ways of 
thinking about “ethics”’. By leaving open the question of what is of fundamental 
moral significance and placing a central emphasis on pluriversal dialogue, decolonial 
ethics remains open and disruptive, even as it is put into a more formal ethical 
register.  
v See, i.e., Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007. For an account of the differences 
between decolonial intercultural dialogue and Habermasian discourse ethics, see 
Dussel, 2013, 121-140 and Conway and Singh, 2009.  
vi My focus, here, is on the tensions within decolonial thought that stem from the dual 
aspect of the idea of pluriversality. There is insufficient space to address important 
tensions across decolonial and postcolonial thought. Postcolonial critics of decolonial 
thought claim that it too talks about the “poor”, the “victims” and “Western” ideas, 
practices and thought in homogeneous terms, and hence fails to do justice to the 
internal differences within these broad categories. See Cheah, 2006. For a decolonial 
response, see Alcoff, 2012.  
vii I leave open context-specific questions concerning when and how such dialogue 
amongst the oppressed should open out to broader dialogue.  
 
